Correspondence between Amir Sheibany, (questions) and SM (author of we had hope) (answers)

My replies to the correspondence below is posted here

I have received volumes of responses to my recent article and "letter to editor" of Iranian Times e-journal (iranian.com).  Practically all responses have had the theme "I agree with you, but" and a few have been highly critical.  These have been a great source of happiness for me: to see my compatriots participating in a political debate over the future of Iran with vigor and conviction.  My only fear is that this debate as well as other debates, media blitzes and tours, and other intellectual exercises would become an end in themselves much like in the past when in early 1980, there were regular conferences, seminars, press releases, on Iran and its future held.  Almost every week then Prime Minister Bakhtiar, A. BaniSadr, M. Rajavi,..and Iranian intellectuals in UK, Germany, USA, and France were holding court, making speeches, giving interviews, writing articles, and in short endlessly debating and talking. 

Debates are good and a healthy requirements.  But nothing will change without action, mobilization, and organization. Much of the questions I have received in responses to my article and letter have had the same theme.  Because time does not allow me to answer each individually, I have picked 12 questions from the texts of emails from Amir Sheibany and Dr. Aryanpour and have answered them below. 

I am presenting them to you with the request that in your free time and when convenient, to review the questions and answers and kindly provide me with your feedback and critique.  As you notice, the topic has been important and dear to me sufficiently enough to spent a good amount of time in reading your emails and answering to them.  Those who know me personally, know how much I value my compatriots point of view, sincere criticism, and opinions when presented with brutal honesty and even though they differ from my own. I apologize, especially to Peerouz, for the lengthiness of my responses.  And that is much due to the fact that I hate to be vague, unclear and indefinite in my responses.  Also since the list of respondents is long and my email server does not allow me to send a long list of recipients (to prevent SPAM), I have broken the list to smaller groups and sending each group separately. With Best wishes and warmest regards,


(1) "My assumption has been that with their budgets and organization size, they are not any better equipped that myself and a few friends."

I disagree with you on this. You are correct that currently Reza Pahlavi?s organization is small, however, he can put up an upward of 1 billion dollars toward his campaign, if he wished so, without causing a dent in his family wealth, estimated at minimum to be $20 billion. Note that I am not talking about his personal wealth but rather his family wealth. The Pahlavi Family has been able to recover much of their wealth and even more much thanks to the IRI?s stupidity and incompetence. For example, a very elaborate villa/mansion in St. Moritz, Switzerland was purchased by the Imperial Government of Iran in 1965. After the Islamic Revolution, there was a dispute on whether the villa belonged to the Iranian government (i.e. IRI) or the Pahlavi family. The issue went to court. The court took custodial possession of the mansion until a decision would be reached. Meanwhile, the court, which was made responsible for the maintenance of the villa, leased the mansion to an Italian industrialist, who served as the Prime Minister of Italy, at a rate of $500,000 a month. The income from the lease went to an escrow account, to be given at a later date to whomever the court deemed as the proper owner of the mansion. In 1994, based on an agreement reached between U.S. and Iran after the hostage crisis [Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223 and Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria Concerning the Settlement of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Jan. 19, 1981, 20 I.L.M. 223, 230.], the court issued a verdict that the rightful owner of the mansion was Shams Pahlavi, the sister of Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. This was reported in some journals, including Iran Times published in Washington, D.C. For confirmation, please contact Mr. Djavad Khakbaz, editor-in-chief, Iran Times, Tel. (202) 659-9869. You can also contact Ashraf Pahlavi at: 12 Ave. Montaigne, 75016 Paris FRANCE.

In September 1980, realizing the hostage crisis could serve no further diplomatic or political end, the Rajai government indicated to Washington through a diplomat of West Germany that it was ready to negotiate in earnest for the release of the hostages. Talks opened on September 14 in West Germany and continued for the next four months, with the Algerians acting as intermediaries. The hostages were released on January 20, 1981, concurrently with President Ronald Reagan's taking the oath of office. The United States in return released US$11 to US$12 billion in Iranian funds that had been frozen by presidential order. Iran, however, agreed to repay US$5.1 billion in syndicated and non-syndicated loans owed to United States and foreign banks and to place another US$1 billion in an escrow account, pending the settlement of claims filed against Iran by United States firms and citizens. These claims, and Iranian claims against United States firms, were adjudicated by a special tribunal of the International Court of Justice at The Hague, established under the terms of the Algiers Agreement. The terms of this agreement were quite advantageous to United States and disadvantageous to Iran. IRI was caught in a quagmire and did not know how to get out of the hostage-taking issue face-savingly. The agreement provided for a way out whereby IRI could claim some empty victory. This agreement granted the judicial review and decision of any legal dispute between U.S. Government, U.S. Citizen (including naturalized U.S. Citizens of Iranian origin), U.S. firms and Iran to the American courts rather than ICJ (International Court of Justice) and certainly not to the Iranian courts even if the merits of case required so.

Authors have said that to determine precise statistics with regard to the land and property owned abroad by the Shah and his close relatives is by no means an easy task; and that moreover, a complete list of such possessions is not in fact available. A few examples of such possessions which were owned by the Shah are as follows: several hectares of land in Australia; several large islands in Italy owned by Farah (the Shah's wife); vast areas of the banks of the Geneva Lake; four glorious palaces in the highly sought-after areas of Paris and Switzerland; the village of Saint Moritz; an entire ski slope and a winter palace in Switzerland; several large mansions in California, Texas and Florida. Refer to: Man va Khandan-i Pahlavi, Mas`ud Ansari; Pas az Suqut, Ansari; The Rise and Fall of the Pahlavi Dynasty, Husayn Fardust; Kayhan newspaper, February 25, 1979; and The Shah's Last Ride, the Fate of an Ally, William Shawcross...

"The shah died in Egypt in 1980, reportedly leaving tens of millions of dollars or more to his family. Ten years later, the money was gone. Pahlavi sued his financial adviser, accusing him of squandering millions of dollars of the family's money. The adviser said Pahlavi ran through the money himself, but the court ruled against him and ordered him to pay Pahlavi $7.3 million. Today, Pahlavi lives modestly with his wife, who is a lawyer, and two daughters. He does not work himself, but gets some financial support from other Iranians living abroad."

[Source: http://www.abcnews.go.com/sections/2020/DailyNews/2020_sonofshah_011114.html]

Iranians, generally, are not as financially generous as one might suspect when it comes to supporting causes they endorse or resources from which they benefit. Case in point is the e-journal, Iranian Times, run by Jahanshah Javid. I have been a reader of this journal since 1995. I estimate that it has a large readership in the range of 10,000 to 30,000 both within Iran and abroad. But I suspect that it has a much smaller number of subscribers.

In March of 1980, I got together with two filmmakers, who had also been students at Tehran University in early 1970s, to work on a documentary on Iran?s sociopolitical history since WWII. We completed our preliminary research and collected a whole set of documents, books, newspaper articles (both Iranian and foreign),? But then, we needed funding to make the documentary. We wrote proposals for funding and submitted it first to the Iranian Interest Section at Algerian Embassy. Though the response was at first positive, they wanted full control over the production and editing of the documentary. We did not wish this to become a propaganda tool and wanted the documentary to be as objective and unbiased as possible. When that did not work, we applied for grants from other sources including MacArthur Foundation, Ford Foundation, ?.. But we did not succeed. We appealed to many Iranian academicians in U.S. and Europe for support and received nothing except encouraging word and volunteering for being interviewed at length.

So considering how Pahlavi family and their cronies like Ansari brothers profited from Iranian treasury and natural resources, it would only be right if they would now devote their financial resources to make things right, to bring a rule of pluralistic democracy and transparent government to Iran.

(2) "short of trying to use the shahzadeh's name and legacy for furthering your own political goals."

I resent and detest this statement of yours. I have been politically active for the past 30 years. If I were an opportunist, there were plenty of opportunities. I have never towed anyone?s political lines. I have always strived to be independent and upright in my thinking and action. Immediately after the Iranian Revolution of 1979, I was contacted by some of its leading people within the Nehzate- Azadi and Jebheye Melli. Based on my background and history as a student leader in CIS, I was asked if I would assume the responsibility of Charge-de-Affairs or a related post as a political officer at Iranian Embassy in Washington. This was late February-early March of 1979. I turned it down, citing that I would rather complete my education further toward graduate degrees. The position was then extended to other student leaders in the United States who also refused to accept it. Then finally, the son-in-law of Dr. Ebrahim Yazdi, who was then a graduate student in Physics at Yale University, was appointed as the Charge-de-Affairs of Iranian Embassy during the Bazargan government. When the late Dr. Karim Sanjabi was then asked about that appointment and Dr. Yazdi?s son-in-law qualification for it, Dr. Sanjabi smiled and said "he [the son-in-law] spoke English with Oxford accent." In 1980, Hojatt-ul-Islam Ezheii offered my brother, who is fluent in German, a diplomatic post in Germany. My brother turned it down citing that he did not feel qualified. I hold a B.S. in Nuclear Engineering, another B.S. in Mechanical Engineering, a M.S. in Mechanical Engineering, and will have a PhD in Systems Engineering by June 2002. I have a comfortable life. I am happy where I am now and have no political ambition. The natural bent of my mind is to science. But science cannot flourish without democracy. I do admit that I greatly care for my country and nation. And for that, I have suffered greatly. In Feb. 1980, the IRI stopped my parents from sending me funds which was necessary for my education. In 1981, IRI confiscated my passport. In 1984, the Article 90 Commission of Iranian parliament effectively stripped of my citizenship. Between 1980 to 1984, my family was severely harassed, intimidated and hurt. I finally managed to get them out and through hardship, working as a cab driver, supermarket stockboy, a restaurant dishwasher,?..I supported them until my siblings completed their education and life after a long ten-year period returned to normal. Believe me, I have paid my dues.

Saied Reza Pahlavi, despite your assertions, does not have much of a legacy. What legacy? What has he accomplished so far? Where has he worked? In his interview with ABC, as narrated above, he says he is supported by the money Iranians sent him and from the income his wife makes as a lawyer. I recall, in early 1980s, when the weather bureau would predict that it would rain in Tehran tomorrow, both Reza Pahlavi and MKO would announce that their supporters would turn on their windshield wipers in Tehran tomorrow as a sign of support. When, there were black-outs in Tehran due to aerial attacks from Iraq, both Reza Pahlavi and MKO would claim that people in Tehran turned on their automobile headlights in their support. Now, when there is a great discontent among Iranian youth and disillusionment with IRI, when after a football game, the youth rebel and verbally denounce the regime, again both Reza Pahlavi and MKO take credit for it.

The mullahs are very clever. Note that they allow outburst of anger and rebellion after a football game but not any protest in the streets at any other time such as on the anniversary of the Forouhars? murder or similar events. This allows the mullahs to label the post-football game?s disturbances as similar to what occurs in Europe and elsewhere after soccer games, where the fans of the loosing side get rowdy or the fans of opposing teams get into fights and start disturbances. This gives the mullahs an opportunity to allow the youth to let some steam off and drop the pressure in the pressure cooker that is Iran, preventing an undesirable burst of protest, which could run out of control, and into a widespread revolt. But because such outbursts are associated with a soccer game, it gives the regime the opportunity to classify it as a post-game civil disturbance by the fans rather than a political protest against the regime?s policies.

In closing this question, if I was interested in riding on Reza Pahlavi?s coat-tail, if he ever had one, I should be supporting him, his stance, his activities, and his claims as you, Amir, are. But rather I am challenging him to do what is right, prudent and expedient.

(3) "what can I, you, and the Shah's office do (in your opinion) to bring Iran to a UN Sponsored referendum."

You had raised this question in two of your earlier emails and each time I responded in details. I cannot help it if you refuse to acknowledge that it had been responded to and keep raising it again. Here, once again, is what I wrote you earlier.

As long as the content and manner by which such a referendum is going to be held remains ambiguous and vague, no one of sound mind and familiar with the experience of 1979 revolution can support it. We are once bitten, twice shy. Recall the referendum, which was held in March of 1979, regarding selection of type of government in Iran. I remember driving with 35 other friends & acquaintances, of various persuasions, from Buffalo, New York to Washington, D.C. to participate in that referendum at Iran?s Embassy. I was shocked to find out that the referendum allowed me only a "yes" or "no" answer to a single undefined choice of "Islamic Republic." It was barely more than a month after Feb. 12, 1979. No serious debate had taken place within Iran, much less in abroad, regarding the nature, structure, and form of an "Islamic Republic." Worse yet, there was no existing or even historical example of a system of government titled as such. During that referendum, I objected and protested to those monitoring at Iranian Embassy and stated that I could not participate in a referendum which first has limited my choice to one, and then at that, to an unknown undefined system of government.

Today, even the "reformists" such as Hojatt-ul-Islam Khalkhali and Khamenei (the "supreme leader"?s brother) are calling for a referendum. Would you support their referendum blindly without knowing in what context and design, on what premises, how and in what manner it will be held? Would you want to become a toy in the "good cop/bad cop" game that President Khatami and the "supreme leader" Khamenei have been playing since 1997?

(4) "The two questions again were, from your letter to RP: "Thus, if you are serious about acting as a catalyst to forge a united front for the eventual establishment of a secular, pluralistic, populist western democracy in Iran, it is essential to declare from outset that you have no interest in resuming power as a monarch in any form or structure. Furthermore, you need to admit to the mistakes of the past and set yourself apart from them" I just don't get the logic. I hear all this talk from the Mossadegist saying Reza joon, stop wasting your time with Iranian Shahanshahi, and join us in ... and I don't quite get that either. The Referendum is about the Iranian people choosing from Republic or Monarchy, why is this issue even up for discussion right now?"

I look at history with a pair of "brutal reality" lenses. The past four kings of Iran died in exile. They were either sent to exile by Iranian nation or by their foreign master who brought them to power in the first place. For those who ask why constitutional monarchy cannot work in a future Iran as is now in practice in Spain, Japan, U.K.,?.. I ask in which of those countries their last two dynasties were overthrown by popular uprisals? In which of those countries, any of their last four "constitutional" monarchs disregarded and trampled on the constitution that had legitimized their rule and implemented autocratic rule? In which one of those countries, any of their last 4 monarchs were charged with corruption or acting as puppet of foreign governments? In Iran, we have long passed the stage where a constitutional monarchy would have worked even if there ever were an Iranian monarch who would abide by the limits the constitution places on him.

Any rational person learns from experience. Most Iranians and I have learned not to let our potential and assumed "leaders" lead us with vague and unclear ideas and plans. I wrote on that on my essay "We Had Hope," on how Khomeini, while in Paris, would not be definitive on any item and postpone such definitions to future. We have learned the danger of postponing such questions to future. That is why we ask our leaders to be clear, transparent, precise and definitive in what they propose our future should be and how we are to achieve it. That is why it is important for Reza Pahlavi to present a clear and definitive plan as to what his concept and plan of a U.N.-sponsored and monitor referendum is.

Now suppose, we had a referendum tomorrow and the people of Iran voted overwhelmingly for Western democracy, what would occur next? What is the next plan? Do you think then Khamenei and his cliques would readily step aside after such a referendum and transfer the reign of power and government to a new provisional government without a fight? In 1978-1979, when we had focused all our energies on the overthrow of the monarchy, we made a serious error not to ask our leaders and ourselves what would be next? What system of government would replace the monarchy? What form, shape, structure, programme, plans and system of checks and balances would this new government have. We will not make that mistake again!

As I wrote you earlier, I have never belonged to any political party or organization in my life. I detest political labels because very often they obscure and confuse the character of an individual, assume a monolithic nature for him, and muddy any intelligent dialogue. But if there ever were a label that I would wear, it would be that I am a "Mossadegist" and I wear that label with pride and humility.

(5) "I was just extremely frustrated to see all of a sudden so much hatred, passion develop in a country which seemed to me 'stable'.-Cyrus Kadivar

The fact that you felt Iran was "stable" during late 1970s probably stems from lack of political consciousness and awareness at that time. In September 1977, while we were organizing for a massive demonstration against Shah's U.S. visit two months later (November 14-15, 1977), I wrote to my father in Iran that the level of discontent with the regime had reached high enough for a massive revolt. The Shah had also disaffected American policymakers and politicians. I recall a meeting with Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, member of Congressional Foreign Relations Committee, a year later (1978), where he described the Shah as a "megalomaniac" and "a danger to the [Persian Gulf] region's security not by will but inadvertently because of lack of wisdom.

(6) "For this senator to call the Shah's desire to secure it's borders and remedy its economic backwardness in the shortest period of time as "megalomania" is indicative of his political leanings and interests. Why an Iranian should repeat these accusations, especially after the last 23 years of war, and stalled growth is the mystery here. Article: (page 5 focuses on Megalomania) http://www.amiran.com/other/sphinx1.htm "

I repeat these accusations because I know they are true. Recall the "2500th Anniversary of Monarchism" in 1971 celebrations organized by the Shah and paid by the people of Iran. The monarchists portray the Shah as someone who took pride in Iranian heritage. But during the entire length of the "2500th Anniversary of Monarchism," the invited foreign heads of state and dignitaries were treated to lunch and dinners of French cuisine flown JIT (Just-in-Time) from France?s top restaurants by 747 Boeing jets in the service of Iran Air. Was not Iranian cuisine sufficiently good for these heads of state and foreign dignitaries? So much for taking pride in Iranian culture and history.

You had referred me to the following excerpt [http://www.iranian.com/FereydounHoveyda/2000/August/Shah/index.html ] from F. Hoveyda?s book where Shah supposedly tells F.H. : "They are angry at my policies. I have truly and practically nationalized the oil industry. Mossadegh did nothing of the sort. His nationalization of the British company was just words on paper. We were almost ruined and had to accept the 'consortium' agreement with several Western oil corporations including the British! I have just dismissed them all and taken into my own hands all the oil business, from extraction to the selling of our refined products in gas stations all over the world! The National Iranian Oil Company is now one of the great oil corporations of the world. The eighth sister!" If Shah was so much for Nationalization of Iranian Oil, why did he and his court oppose Mossadegh?s effort in that direction during 1951-1953. !" If Shah was so much for Nationalization of Iranian Oil, why did he accept the imposed "7-Sisters" agreement after the shameful coup of July 1953? Are we to believe that if Mossadegh had never appeared on the political scene of Iran after WWII, had he never called for Nationalization of Iranian Oil, had he never mobilized the nation in that direction, Shah would have himself spearheaded such nationalization effort. Shah, much like his successors, takes credit for the efforts and sacrifices of others.

Furthermore, F.H. writes:? "At any rate," he [Shah] continued, "this is secondary. I am devising plans, which will crown my White Revolution. Now that economic welfare has been achieved and our defense and recuperation of our oil resources give us an edge on our neighbors, we are not a developing country anymore. We are among the advanced ones. Soon, we will be in the vicinity of the so-called 7-Gs. I think therefore the time has come to transform our regime into a genuine constitutional monarchy. Juan Carlos did it in Spain, a country less rich than ours!"? Why did the Shah wait until April 1978 to plan a referendum for April 1979? Why did he not move towards a democratic system a year , two years,..earlier? If the Shah wished to move Iran toward a Constitutional Monarchy, why did he then only four year before he supposedly spoke those words to F.H., in 1974, banned all political parties in Iran, though they were all loyal to him, and established a one-party system, his Rastaakhiz Party?

One should not merely believe whatever he hears. Critical thinking is the hallmark of understanding. One should also not rely only on similar sources or sources with similar inclinations. If one wishes to understand, be it history or science, one must read on a topic from a wide variety and completely different sources. Then analyze what they have said with a rational, critical mind.

I recall one day, at the meeting of Iranian student club at UB, in summer of 1980, a young gentlemen quite influenced by the events of the time and the charisma of Khomeini, stood before the podium to read a biographical sketch of Khomeini, which he had supposedly researched and written. He claimed that Reza Shah (Reza MirPanj) had ordered the murder of Khomeini?s father. I then only knew of Khomeini?s latter part of life since 1963. I knew nothing of his childhood or family history. But using the information that the young speaker was providing, I began to question him. Khomeini was born in 1899. He lost his father while a toddler and according to the speaker at the age of 4. That means that Khomeini had lost his father in 1903, two years before the Constitutional Revolution. I knew Reza MirPanj had been in his mid-40s at the time of his 1921 coup. At the time, Khomeini had lost his father, Reza MirPanj would have been only 26 years old, just a Kazak soldier with a corporal rank in the Qajar army. What motivation or power would have Reza MirPanj have at that time to order the murder of Khomeini?s father?

When I asked that question, the speaker?s face turned red and he began stuttering and mumbling. But this did not bother me as much as the fact that no one in the entire 50+ Iranian college students of very high intelligence, enough to be admitted to UB?s top difficult fields, did add up the numbers to check the verity of the speaker?s claim. Critical thinking is a must, otherwise we are bound to repeat the history.

(7) "Why should the Shah denounce the Iranian Shahanshahi and his own role as its standard bearer?"

I have already answered this above and also in my previous emails and articles. Yet if you feel those are inadequate let me know how and why and I will elaborate further.

(8) "How can we get the same mass demonstrations/strikes and blackouts as 23 years ago knowing full well this time round that externally the West (and its media) will not benefit in undermining the mullah regime as it did the Shah's regime, and internally the average populace has no faith in our politicians and would be politicians?"

 I had answered this question in details in my letter to RP as well as in articles published elsewhere, which you have probably read. Please review articles published in "Rahnavard", "Payam Ashena", "Mehregan",??

It is erroneous to believe that the West, particularly the United States, did wish the fall of the Shah. Shah had been a faithful servant. He had successfully implemented the Nixon doctrine in the Gulf region. His large and extravagant purchases of sophisticated military hardware were a boon to U.S. military industrial complex and U.S. economy. His armed forces served as proxy in promoting, maintaining, and preserving West?s economical and geopolitical interests in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean and in squelching and suppressing any voice of dissent not only in Iran but also in the region. Shah?s army, for example, was heavily involved in suppressing the anti-emirate rebellion in Oman and in insuring secured flow of oil from Persian Gulf to Indian Ocean in route to West. By all means, the Shah did serve the West?s interests and goal very well.

However, by late 1978 and early 1979, United States opted for the rule of clerics in Iran to avoid other unwanted alternatives such as coming to power of left-leaning or leftist political forces which may have tilted the balance of regional power to the Soviet Union and/or China. This is confirmed if you read press and media interviews and well as books of Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Carter?s National Security Advisor and self-proclaimed architect of the Afghan "Islamic" resistance. [See http://www.afghanradio.com/news/2001/january/jan16m2001.html, particularly valuable information in the list of references provided.] Zbigniew Brzezinski maintains that by the latter half of 1978, the NSA, CIA, U.S. Ambassador to Iran, William Sullivan, and Mr. Henry Precht, Head of Iran Desk at U.S. State Department had reached the conclusion that the government of the Shah was no longer maintainable and furthermore that the best option for the United State was to come in terms and assure the success of clerical regime in Tehran. For that very purpose, when General Huyser was dispatched to Tehran in early January of 1979, he met with Ayatollah Beheshti but did not held court or any briefing with the Shah. Other top U.S. military leaders who were then dispatched to Tehran, did also make contact with the clerics and representatives of Khomeini. The justification for supporting the clerics were given as two-fold by Dr. Brzezinski :"(1) We know that we can cut deals with the clerics, many have ties to bazaar and bazaar-mentality, they are deal-makers unlike the leftist ideologues; (2) they have the religion of Islam as a strong tool to block any Soviet and Chinese, socialist or communist influence in Iran. They can and I expect that they will use this tool to mobilize public support to suppress the Marxists and other shades of the left spectrum to the extents that the Shah could not. Shah, after all, for the sake of his public and international image, was obliged to follow international norms and opinions and could not apply brutal suppression of the leftists. The clerics have no regards for the foregoing and can finish the job that Shah could not."

In 1984, Dr. Brzezinski, gleefully pointed out in a couple of interviews and an article how right he had been both on the Afghan Islamic resistance to the Soviet Occupation of Afghanistan as well as well as what he had predicted what the clerics would do in Iran, citing that "Today, the leftist in Iran have been decimated. They no longer exist in Iran. They have been eliminated from both the political as well as social life. The clerics showed no mercy even on the most harmless leftist academic intellectuals such as Saied Soltanpour,??.."

In that sense, I do agree with you that the West betrayed the Shah.

  1. "If you knew that Iranian's are "idol-worshippers" would you have still supported Khomeini? "

    As I had written in my article, in 1978, we had to make a very difficult decision. Unlike many other opposition groups, we were quite late in joining Khomeini and even then we did with many reservations. We surely opposed the tyrannical rule of the Shah who spent, in the period of 1971 to 1978, more than 40% of Iran?s national budget on the purchase of sophisticated weaponry. United States still owes Iran 4 AWACS planes which Shah purchased in 1976 and prepaid for them before delivery. Those planes, which were made for Iran, were later given to Saudi Arabia though some of their more sophisticated radar modules removed and with the condition that only American pilots and radar specialists/technicians would operate the planes. Please do not misunderstand me, I am not stating that Iran?s national defense should have been ignored but the defense spending should have been proportional to the limits of power and threat of external forces. We had other urgent national issues that needed immediate attention. Of course, as I have outlined in a number of articles under various nom de plum, there were other reasons for our opposition to the Shah, a cause that we shared with an overwhelming majority of Iranians.

    I was personally opposed to having any cleric involved in any political decisions in post-revolution Iran. For example, I was quite disappointed when Mojahedin, of all leftist organization, nominated Khomeini in the first presidential elections. In his many published lectures, Shariati had maintained that clerics couldn?t be corrupted, even if they were themselves inclined to corruption, because of public expectations of a cleric?s observance of moral and ethical norms. I disagreed with that and was witness to a heated argument between my father and Taher Ahmadzadeh, father of Massoud Ahmadzadeh (one of the founders of OPFGI), at Hosseinieh Ershad in 1975, when my father was invited by some friends to attend.

    There were critical decisions made by a variety of forces, groups and personalities that could have changed the course of Iran?s history, if there were made differently. Others and I have written on those before and as an example, I have attached an email exchange with another compatriot of ours that has an example of that contained therein.

    How those decisions were made left us no choice in December 1978 and January 1979 but to throw our support behind Khomeini. But even then, it was made on the premise of promises made by Khomeini to some of which I had referred in that article.

  2. "Do you think that the majority of Iranians are still, even today, idol-worshippers?"

    Yes, but to a much lesser depth and degree than we were in 1978-1979. When I see our youth blindly following people like Soroush, or resting their hopes in Khatami, without considering their background and history and treating these and other personalities as "more than human," I disappointedly admit that some of our negative social and cultural mentality has not yet been remedied to the realities of 21st century.

  3. "Considering the lack of democratic participation by Iranians in the West, would you say that Iranians in Iran are ready for the democracy you proposed in 1979."

Surprisingly, from email exchanges and conversations with those who have visited Iran recently, including a number of foreign journalists, friends, Iranologists,?. I have the impression that Iranians in Iran, particularly the college-educated youth, are far more ready for a Western democracy, than Iranians who have lived abroad. For example, I have been visiting Los Angeles and am in constant communication with many Iranians who live there, including some who would be defined as "community leaders." I cannot believe that so many of them have remained in a sort of time freeze. Their worldview has not change significantly since 1979 and many view Iran as it were then and not as it is now.

(12) "I liked your article, but I'd like to mention one thing.  You admit that you were wrong about the mullahs and about a number of other things that you don't mention (because I think you might have belonged to one of the leftist-Marxist groups).  Fortunately you saw the truth and changed your opinion.  If you give yourself the right to change your mind and admit that you were wrong, why not extend the same courtesy to others?  They have changed their minds too.  They may have changed it sometime after you did, but their sincerity could be just as genuine as yours."    --M. Aryanpur, Ph.D.

I admit that we were misled. I admit that our desperation in ridding ourselves of the old order led us to ignore certain realities, ignore Khomeini?s positions and political stances (against land distribution, against women voting rights,?) in 1963 and readily by into the belief that he had "intellectually matured" and thus "changed" his mind on his old views. In 1963, he had lamented about isolation of the clerics from the society, brought about through government policies such as secularization of educational system. In the old days, the mullahs ran the madrassehs and maktabs. Then mullahs were the teachers, administrators, and ?curriculum developers? of the schools. By 1963, they had lost that element of influence on the society as far as larger towns and cities were concerned. But the mullahs still ran madrassehs and maktabs in the rural areas. Shah?s Six Point reform in 1963, contained a new plan, that of Literacy Corps, which now threatened the mullah?s loss of control over rural education as well.

Yes, Khomeini, while in France, though not in clear and definite terms, did indicate to us that his point of view had changed. When we asked him about the rights of women, his response was that in Iran even the men did not enjoy the human rights unalienable to mankind. At that time, Abol-Hassan BaniSadr, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, Ebrahim Yazdi and host of others were working hard to convince Iranian progressives that Khomeini had been "reformed" away from some of his anachronistic worldviews of 1963. Each of these three gentlemen (i.e. BaniSadr, Ghotbzadeh, Yazdi) had their own contacts and associations within Iran?s progressive political groups and affiliations. For example, Ghotbzadeh had been a student leader in CIS in 1960s, he had been a "Mossadeghist" (using the term our friend Amir Sheibany has used). In 1970s, Ghotbzadeh heavily socialized with French and Swiss socialist and communist figures and politicians. When we questioned the sincerity and the depth of Khomeini?s own understanding of how erroneous and anachronistic views he espoused in 1963 were, we were bombarded with similar arguments that I received today when I pose similar questions regarding Abdolkarim Soroush, the self-proclaimed leader of "New Thought" movement in Iran, Ayatollah Khalkhali, now an ardent supporter of Khatami?s "reforms", and Khatami, himself.

In December 1978, we asked Mr. BaniSadr that if Khomeini has honestly and seriously changed his point of views why he does not come out openly and in definite, clear terms admit that some of his views in 1963 had been erroneous and apologize for that error. BaniSadr responded that then the political exigencies of the time while the country is going through a revolt does not allow such admission of error on part of Khomeini since such admission would seriously undermine the efforts to remove the Shah from power. I followed up with another question asking when was it first that Khomeini had realized that some of his 1963 views and stances had been wrong and if that even and change of mind is not recent why Khomeini did not admit to his change of mind and erroneous stances earlier. In response, Mr. BaniSadr questioned why I am raising such questions at such a critical time like then and demanded "today, only unity."

As Khomeini did not admit in definite and clear terms then that he had been in error in 1963, nor have today Khatami, Soroush, Khalkhali,? and the "leaders" of the "reform" movement in Iran admitted that they were in error during the Cultural Revolution and early years of the revolution; nor has Reza Pahlavi, which according to Amir Sheibany carries the legacy of his father, has admitted to his father?s error as well as to crowning himself only 5 years ago as King, in exile.

Bio of the "moderates"

Khatami has been a part & parcel of IRI?s suppressive system from the very beginning. In 1979, he published an article titled "To Whom Velayate- Faghih belongs?" in defense of "Velayate Faghih" [Guardianship of highest religious Jurisprudence] ? He represented Ardakan and Meibod constituencies in the first term of Majlis [Parliament] in 1980. He was also appointed head of Kayhan newspaper institute by late Ayatollah Khomeini in 1981, where he turned the paper into a mouthpiece for the conservative clerics and a tool against any enlightenment efforts spearheaded by intellectual and short-lived progressive free press of Iran in 1979-1981. In 1982, he was appointed as the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance in the government of Mirhossein Mousavi and thus was the head instrument of suppression, censor, and propaganda designed to stupefy a nation. During the 1980-1988 war with Iraq, he served different responsibilities including deputy and head of the Joint Command of the Armed Forces and chairman of the War Propaganda Headquarters. Here he served in a war that could have been brought to an end in 1982 when Iran had recovered all of its territory and when Iraq put forward a number of proposals for cease-fire and end of hostility. In his memoirs, published via interent, Ayatollah Montazeri, writes of the zeal and destructive drive of Khomeini and his clique who found in that war the strongest tool to silence any and all opposition and to divert the national focus from the poor management of the economy, the growing corruption within the ranks of IRI, and ever mounting failures of the regime in all aspects of Iranian life. Khatami was once again appointed as the Minister of Culture and Islamic Guidance by Hashemi Rafsanjani in 1989. Following his resignation in 1992, Khatami was appointed as cultural advisor to President Rafsanjani and head of Iran's National Library. In 1996, he was appointed as a member of High Council for Cultural Revolution by the Khamenei. As president of Iran, he has been the head of the of High Council for Cultural Revolution. I do not need to remind the reader that it was the Cultural Revolution that destroyed Iran?s superior education system and forced hundreds of the finest Iranian minds such as Professors Seyyed Hossein Nasr, Mohammad Mahjoub, and Ehsan Yar-Shater, Dr. M. Lashkari, Dr. Karim Sanjabi, Professor Ali Javan, ?to seek survival abroad, and no matter how much each did not want it, in the service of "bigaaneh." [source: http://www.persia.org/khatami/biography.html]

 
Khatami's official political position
Khatami's possible involvement after the Mikonos trial.
Comments on Moderates (1.), (2.), 

"It is necessary that blood should be spilled. The more Iran bleeds, the greater will be the victory of the revolution" Ayatollah Khomeini, 1980

Reply to points raise above here

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